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FACTUAL BACKGROUND

The concept of human dignity covers the entire span of life. The
deprivations to which this article addresses itself are those imposed upon
individuals because of advanced chronological age., Though the plight
of the elderly varies from community to community and from culture to
culture,2 the deprivations, consciously or unconsciously imposed upon the
*Copyright retained by Myres S. McDougal, Harold D. Lasswell, and Lung-chu Chen.
This article is excerpted from a book, HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER, that the
authors have in progress. The authors gratefully acknowledge the criticism and comments
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Social Sciences, Yale Law School.
"**LL.B., 1958, National Taiwan University; LL.M., 1961, Northwestern University;
LL.M., 1962, J.S.D., 1964, Yale University; Senior Research Associate, Yale Law School.
1. The focus here is on the question of discrimination relating to advanced age. On
the protection of children, see generally P. ADAMS, Er AL., CHILDREN'S RIGHTS: TowARD THE
LmERATION OF THE CHILD (1971); D. COHEN, THE LEARNING CHILD (1972); V. DE FRANCIS,
CHILD ABUSE LEGISLATION IN THE 1970's (1970); J. GOLDSTEIN, A. FREUD, & A. SoLrr, BEYOND
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CmLD (1973); J. HOLT, ESCAPE FROM CHILDHOOD (1974); S.
KEENY, HALF THE WORLD's CHILDREN (1957); A. PATTr, THE CmL SAvE s: THE INVENTION
OF DELINQUENCY (1969); H. SIMMONS, PROTECTIVE SERVICES FOR CHILDREN (1968); D. ZIwTz,
CHIrD WELFARE: SERVICES AND PERSPECTIVES (2d ed. 1969); Coughlin, The Rights of Children,

47 CmD WELFARE 133 (1968); Foster & Freed, A Bill of Rights for Children, 6 FAMILY, L.Q.
343 (1972); Kleinfeld, Balance of Power Among Infants, Their Parents and the State, 4
FAMILY L.Q. 410 (1970), 5 FAMILY L.Q. 64 (1971); Katz, Schroeder, & Sidman, Emancipating
Our Children-Coming of Legal Age in America, 7 FAMILY L.Q. 211 (1973); Rezneck, The
Rights of Juveniles, in THE RIGHTS OF AMERICANS: WHAT THEY ARE - WHAT THEY SHOULD BE

469 (N. Dorsen ed., 1970); Rodham, Children Under the Law, 43 HARv. ED. REV. 487 (1973);
Sizer & Whitten, A Proposal for a Poor Children's Bill of Rights, PSYCHOLOGY TODAY, Aug.

1968, at 59-63; Wald, Making Sense Out of the Rights of Youth, 4 HUMAN RIGHTS 13 (1974);
Worsfold, A Philosophical Justification of Children's Rights, 44 HARv. En. REV. 142 (1974).
2. Cruelty in the treatment of the aged is by no means a modern invention as Simone
de Beauvoir has documented in her impressive study: S. DE BEAUVoI, THE COMING OF AGE
(P. O'Brian transl. 1972). Nevertheless, Cowgill and Holmes, using modernization as a
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elderly, have become increasingly apparent as aged segments in the community
continue to expand significantly, especially in highly industrialized societies.3
The unique deprivation of the aged today takes the form of compulsory
(involuntary) retirement from active work life, regardless of an individual's
actual mental and physical capacities, as enforced by a blanket age limitation. 4 Alternatively, the deprivation may be imposed by denying employment
central focus, have demonstrated that "the status of the aged is high in preliterate societies
and is lower and more ambiguous in modern societies" and that "the status of the aged
tends to be high in agricultural societies . . . [while] relatively low in urban, industrial
societies." Cowgill & Holmes, Summary and Conclusions: The Theory in Preview, in AGING
AND MODERNIZATION 305, 310, 315 (D. Cowgill & L. Holmes eds., 1972).
3. Though community attention in the past has focused principally on early childhood,
there has been a proliferation of research in the field of gerontology. This is vividly
exemplified in the United States by the establishment of the National Institute on Aging
(NIA) within the National Institutes of Health (Nil). In May 1974, the United States
Congress enacted the Research on Aging Act of 1974 authorizing the creation of NIA. The
task of NIA is to undertake and coordinate "biomedical, social, and behavioral research
and training related to the aging process and the diseases and other special problems and
needs of the aged." 42 U.S.C.A. §289k-2 (1974).
For a comprehensive study from a global perspective, see Question of the Elderly and the
Aged (Report of the Secretary-General), U.N. Doc. A/9126 (1973) [hereinafter cited as
U.N. Study on the Aged]. For a report on the current state of aging research, see Marx,
Aging Research (I): Cellular Theories of Senescence, 186 SCIENCE 1105 (1974); Marx, Aging
Research (I1): Pacemakers for Aging?, 186 SCIENCE 1196 (1974).
See also AGING AND SOCIAL POLICY (J.McKinney & F. de Vyver eds. 1966); AGING AND
SOCIETY (M. Riley, J. Riley, & M. Johnson eds. 1969); Z. BLAU, OLD AGE IN A CHANGING
SocIETY (1973); J. BOTWINICK, AGING AND BEHAVIOR (1973); M. BRENNAN, P. TAFT, & M.
SCHUPACK, THE ECONOMICS OF AGE (1967); M. CLARK & B. ANDERSON, CULTURE AND AGING
(1967); E. CUMMING & W. HENRY, GROWING OLD (1961); J. DRAKE, THE AGED IN AMERICAN
SOCIETY (1958); GROWING OLD (A. Stoller ed. 1960); HANDBOOK OF AGING AND THE INDIVIDUAL
(J. Birren ed. 1959); HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY (C. Tibbits ed. 1960); 0. KNOPF,
SUCCESSFUL AGING: THE FACrS AND FALLACIES OF GROWING OLD (1975); M. KOLLER, SOCIAL
GERONTOLOGY (1968); A. LEVIN, THE GERIATRIC REVOLUTION (1968); MIDDLE AGE AND AGING
(B. Neugarten ed. 1968); OLD AGE IN AMERICA (G. Lang ed. 1961); C. PERCY, GROWING OLD
IN THE COUNTRY OF THE YOUNG (1974); RESEARCH PLANNING AND AcrION FOR THE ELDERLY:
THE POWER AND POTENTIAL OF SOCIAL SCIENCE (D. Kent, R. Kastenbaum, & S. Sherwood
eds. (1972); M. RILEY & A. FONER, AGING AND SOCIETY (1968); E. SMrrH, HANDBOOK OF AGING
(1972); SOCIL ASPECTS OF ACING (I. Simpson & J. McKinney eds. 1966); THEOREICAL ASPECTS
OF AGING (M. Rockstein ed. 1974); TOWARD AN INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY (H. Sheppard ed.
1970); Social Contribution by the Aging, in THE ANNALS OF THlE AMERICAN ACADEMY OF
POLITICAL & SOCIAL SCIENCE 279 (1952); Symposium - Problems of the Aging, 27 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 1 (1962).
4. This article builds upon previous studies in which the authors have sought to
establish that there has emerged in the world arena a general norm that precludes the
differentiation of individuals by group categorizations that have no consistent relation
to individual capabilities and potentialities. See note 30 infra.
For discussions of constitutionality within the United States, see N. TRONCHIN-JAMS,
ARBITRARY RETIREMENT (1972); Eglit, Is Compulsory Retirement Constitutional? Another
Name for Discrimination .... Civ. LIB. REV. 89-97 (Fall 1974); Note, Age Discrimination in
Employment: Correcting a Constitutionally Infirm Legislative Judgment, 47 S. CAL. L. REv.
1311 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Age Discrimination in Employment]; Note, Mandatory
Retirement - A Vehicle for Age Discrimination,51 CHI.-KENT L. REv. 116 (1974) [hereinafter
cited as Mandatory Retirement]; Note, Too Old to Work: The Constitutionality of Mandatory
Retirement Plans, 44 S. CAL. L. REV. 150 (1971) [hereinafter cited as Too Old to Work].
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opportunity to individuals over a specified age that may vary according
to the occupation. Age-based compulsory retirement tends to precipitate or
accentuate the syndromes of aging, generating many value deprivations that
could otherwise be avoided or mitigated. "Compulsory retirement," in the
words of Eglit, "is just another name for discrimination."5
The traumatic impact of the sudden loss of accustomed roles, precipitated
by involuntary retirement, is immense and profound. As Rosow has sharply
summarized:
[T]he loss of roles excludes the aged from significant social participation
and devalues them. It deprives them of vital functions that underlie
their sense of worth, their self-conceptions and self-esteem. In a word,
they are depreciated and become marginal, alienated from the larger
society. Whatever their ability, they are judged invidiously, as if they
have little of value to contribute to the world's work and affairs. In a
society that rewards men mainly according to their economic utility,
the aged are arbitrarily stigmatized as having little marginal utility of
any kind, either economic or social. On the contrary, they tend to be
tolerated, patronized, ignored, rejected, or viewed as a liability. They
are first excluded from the mainstream of social existence, and because
of this nonparticipation, they are then penalized and denied the re-

wards that earlier came to them routinely.6

Compulsory retirement in a work-oriented society normally means drastic
reduction in income, perhaps resulting in near poverty, even where there is
provision for some sort of socizil security. 7 A drastic decrease in income compels
a significant lowering of the accustomed level and style of living.
The shock of compulsory retirement may be so overwhelming as to
generate a lasting state of anxiety and even depression." The ordinary process
of aging aside, the psychosomatic condition of the elderly may be brutally
and unduly impaired and exacerbated by the shock of involuntary retirement.9 Formerly useful skills are consigned to the scrap heap overnight.
Access to the accustomed flow of information and other sources of enlightenment are lost or substantially reduced. While the power to vote may continue unaffected, eligibility for office-holding, with minor exceptions, is denied.
This implies a concomitant decline in influence upon the making of effective
community decisions and a sharpening sense of powerlessness. Condemning
5. Eglit, supra note 4, at 87.
6. Rosow, The Social Context of the Aging Self, 13 THE GERoNToLOGIST 82, 82 (1973)
(emphasis original).
7. Cf. S. DE BEAuvoIR, supra note 2, at 216-77; J. CORSON & J. McCoNNELL, EcoNoMC
NEEDS OF OLDER PEOPLE (1956); EMPLOYMENT, INCOME, AND RrMREFNT PROBLEMS OF THE
AGm (J. Kreps ed. 1963); SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, 91st Cong., 2d Sess., LEGAL
PROBLEMS AFFECTING OLRn
AMERICANS (A working paper) 1-2 (1970); Age Discrimination
in Employment, supra note 4; Mandatory Retirement, supra note 4, at 121; Too Old to
Work, supra note 4, at 152-55.
8. S. DE BEAUVOIR, supra note 2, at 269. Cf. R. BUTLER & M. LEwLs, AGING AND MENTAL
HEALTH (1973).
9. It has been suggested that compulsory retirement can be an important source of
disease. M. BARRON, THE AGING AMERICAN 76 (1961); SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING 1969, S. REP. No. 91-875, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 115 (1970),
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the elderly to "an idleness that hastens their decline,"'10 age-based involuntary
retirement tends to affect all personal relations and to evoke "the sorrow
of parting, the feeling of abandonment, solitude and uselessness."' '
In sum, from an active and useful member of society, overnight an aged
person is relegated to the club of senior citizens under a thoughtless, inconsiderate system of compulsory retirement and becomes a target of condescension, neglect, and contempt. Instead of embarking upon a new life
of enjoyable leisure in the "golden years," people who are forced to retire,
except for a fortunate few, are thrust into an agonizing path of doubt, insecurity, emptiness, and futility. 12 They are bluntly "redefined," in the words
of Rosow, "as old and obsolete."' Is He noted: "The norms applied to them
change quickly from achievement to ascription, from criteria of performance
to those of sheer age regardless of personal accomplishment. People who
were formerly judged as individuals are then bewilderingly treated as mem14
bers of an invidious category."'
BASIC COMMUNITY POLICIES

The critical policies of honoring freedom of individual choice and of
fostering the utmost contribution by individuals to the aggregate common
interest should protect the aged as well as other members of a community.
To deny or restrict an individual's opportunity to work and to participate
in other value processes, purely on the basis of an arbitrary chronological
age limit, is not compatible with the overriding policy of human dignity.
Compulsory retirement on the basis of a specified age has commonly been
justified on several grounds. First, the elderly on reaching a certain specified
age are said to become inefficient workers because of conspicuous deterioration
both in intellectual and physical capabilities. 15 Second, it is allegedly impracticable to effect retirement ("to weed out deadwood") on a selective,
individualized basis.' 6 Third, mandatory retirement guided by chronological
age serves the common interest by opening up avenues of advancement
(promotion) and job opportunity for the young.'7 Fourth, age-based mandatory

supra note 2, at 273.
Id. at 269. Cf. C. ROSENBERG, THE WORKER

10.

S. DE BEAUVOIR,

11.
12.
13.
14.
15.

GROWS OLD (1970).
But see, e.g., 0. KNOPF, supra note 3.
Rosow, supra note 6, at :32.
Id. at 82-83.
See HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY, supra note 3, at 307-08; H. LoETHER,

PROBLEMS OF

AGING,

SOCIOLOGICAL AND

SOCIAL

PSYCHOLOGICAL 59-60

(1967); Hearings on

S. 830, S. 788 Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the Senate Comm. on Labor and Public
Welfare, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. 369-70 (1967); Waldman & Levine, Is Compulsory Retirement
Constitutional? . . . Serves a Valid and Legal Social Purpose, Civ. Lm. REv. 98-101
(Fall 1974); Mandatory Retirement, supra note 4, at 118; Too Old to Work, supra note
4, at 151.
16. See Waldman & Levine, supra note 15, at 102; Johnson, The Superficial Aspect,
When's Time to Retire?, NEw REPUBLIC, July 6. 1959, at 16.
17. See Bernstein, The Pu'sh for Early Retirement, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 22, 1964, at
23; Gordon, The Older Worker and Retirement Policies, 83 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 577, 581
(1960); Waldman & Levine, supra note 15, at 99.
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retirement enables "the prospective retiree to plan ahead with certainty,"1 8
instead of being shocked by a sudden retirement that is dictated by haphazard,
ad hoc criteria.

Underlying the defense of age-based compulsory retirement there is a
blanket assumption, allegedly based upon statistics, about the stereotyped disabilities (mental and physical deterioration) of people reaching a certain

age.1 9 As gerontological studies accelerate and deepen, such an assumption

encounters growing challenge. 20 In the light of contemporary knowledge
it would appear that no blanket assumption about the incapacity of people
over a fixed age can be accepted until it is factually demonstrated. It is
obvious that a mere assertion is not an acceptable substitute for fact. The

consequences are especially grave when the ends of enlightened policy are
not served. Irrebuttable presumptions that preclude individualized determinations based on close contextual scrutiny cannot be tolerated. Actually, in-

dividuals both mature and decline at different rates for different capabilities;
moreover, research indicates that "[g]eneral intellectual decline in old age
2
is argely a myth." '
The argument as to the impossibility of administering a retirement policy
on an individualized basis cannot withstand scrutiny. It is no more difficult
to make decisions concerning retirement on an individualized basis than

to make day to day decisions concerning hiring, discipline, or promotion of
individual employees.22 The appropriate criterion should be whether a person

is presently capable of performing the task required, not when he or she
was born.
To meet the critical job needs of the young by creating more job opportunities is of fundamental importance to sound public policy. Even granting
18. MONRONEY, FEDERAL STAFF RETIREMENT SYSTS, S. Doc. No. 14, 90th Cong., 1st
Sess. 73 (1967).
19. Eglit, supra note 4, at 92-93.
20. See SENATE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING, DEVELOPMENTS IN AGING: 1972 AND JANUARYMARCH 1973, S. REP. No. 93-147, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. 72 (1973); U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE
LAW AGAINST AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT (W.H. Pub. 1303, Sept. 1970); WHrrIE

(1971); 1971 WHIrrE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON
(1971); Mandatory Retirement, supra note 4,
at 118-19; Too Old to Work, supra note 4. at 159-61.
For an interesting study that compares different ages at which peak performance is
achieved in various professions and occupations, see H. LEHMUAN, AGE AND ACHIEVEMENT
(1953). See also World Health Organization, Health Concerns of the Elderly and the Aged
in U.N. Study on the Aged, supra note 3, Annex HI, at 6-7.
21. Bakes & Schaie, Aging and I.Q.: The Myth of the Twilight Years, PSYCHOLOGY
TODAY 35 (March 1974). See also G. MATHIASEN, CRITERIA FOR RETIREMENT 88, 92 (1952);
THE NATIONAL COUNCIL ON THE AGING, UTILIZATION OF OLDER PROFESSIONAL AND SCaINTFIC
WORKERS 9 (1961); REPORT: SEMINAR ON EMPLOYABILITY OF OLDER PERSONS 11 (J. Birren ed.
HOUSE

CONFERENCE

ON

AGING,

RETIREMENT

AGING, TOWARD A NATIONAL POLICY ON AGING

1963); U.S.

DEP'T OF LABOR, BUREAU OF LABOR STATIsTICs: INDUSTRIAL RETRAINING PROGRAMS
FOR TECHNOLOGICAL CHANGE 6 (1963); Kutscher & Walker, Comparative Job Performance
of Office Workers by Age, 83 MoNTHLY LAB. REv. 39 (1960); Walker, Job Performance of

Federal Mail Sorters by Age, 87 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 296 (1964); Weinberg, Older Workers'
Performance in Industrial Retraining Programs, 86 MONTHLY LAB. REv. 935 (1963); Too
Old to Work, supra note 4, at 159-61.
22. Eglit, supra note 4, at 92.
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that the absorbing capacity of the job market is limited at any given time,
the policy of making room for the young at the expense of active older
bread earners - completely disregarding actual capability and fitness - is
nothing more than "the shifting of the problem of insufficient jobs from
one age group to another.' ' 23 The challenge of "distributive justice" remains
unresolved by the body politic. Extravagant and ruthless waste of enormously
useful talents and skills, seasoned by years of practical experience, is scarcely
the way to augment the aggregate common interest.
It may further be observed that the knowledge that one is about to
receive a declaration of instant obsolescence and uselessness on the authority
imputed to the calendar is no key to a smooth, anxiety-free transition from
one role or status to another.2 4 If anything, a keen sense of deprivation and
injustice may become so overwhelming as to engulf the involuntary retiree
in a sea of nameless emptiness and chronic trauma.2 5 Human beings, it may
be reiterated, are not appropriately treated "by category" rather than as
persons. Human dignity is best achieved by treating each person according
to his or her unique capability and potential. Chronological age is but one
of multiple indices of individual capability and potentiality. "You cannot,"
wrote Eglit, "consign people to the arbitrary, inflexible fate of forced retirement without at the same time offending fairness and the concept of equality
which are fundamental to our society." 26 Unlike discriminations on the
ground of race or sex, discrimination on the basis of advanced chronological
age has keen personal implications for every member of the community because
aging is a process common to everyone.
Thus, the quality of society and the degree to which human dignity values
are fulfilled may be measured by the treatment accorded to the aged
members of the population. The treatment of the elderly concerns not only
the elderly; it involves the identity system of the self and of the whole society
of which the self is a part. In primitive societies the elderly were highly
prized largely because of their rarity. 27 In the contemporary world, because of
23. Id.
24. L. KUTNER ET AL., FIVE HUNDRED OVER SIXTY 88-89, 253 (1956); Too Old to Work,
supra note 4, at 155-58.
25. "All gerontologists agree that living the last twenty years of one's life in a state
of physical fitness but without any useful activity is psychologically and sociologically impossible. Those who live on must be given some reason for living: mere survival is worse

than death." S. DE

BEAUVOIR,

supra note 2, at 272-73.

In the words of the American Medical Association Committee on Aging: "Compulsory
retirement on the basis of age will impair the health of many individuals whose job
represents a major source of status, creative satisfaction, social relationships or self-respect.
It will be equally disastrous for the individual who works only because he has to, and
who has a minimum of meaningful goals or interests in life, job-related or otherwise.
Job separation may well deprive such a person of his only source of identification, and
leave him foundering in a motivational vacuum with no frame of reference whatever."
Hearings Before the Senate Subcomm. on Retirement and the Individual of the Senate
Special Comm. on Aging, 90th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 307 (1967).
26. Eglit, supra note 4, at 88.
27. See AGING AND MODERNIZATION, note 2 supra. See also M. BARRON, supra note 9, at
25-26; Donahue, Orbach, & Pollak, Retirement: The Emerging Social Pattern, in HANDBOOK
OF SOCIAL GERONTOLOGY, supra note 3, at 330, 334-36.
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advances in science and technology, the life expectancy of humankind continues
to grow, and this planet is endowed with ever increasing numbers of people
living well beyond the years that were formerly thought possible. 28 As the
life sciences continue to flourish, especially in gerontology, there is every
indication that this trend will continue, barring unforeseeable catastrophies.
Whether the longevity made possible by the cumulative heritage of humankind will become an advantage or a curse in disguise presents a critical test
for modem civilization. The resulting important community task is that of
devising criteria and procedures appropriate for appraising individual capabilities and potentialities at every chronological age. To maximize the selffulfillment of individuals and their contributions to the common interest, it is
potential receive the fullest possible expression at
imperative that individual
29
all stages of life.
TRENDS IN DECISION

The United Nations Charter and its ancillary human rights prescriptions
do not specifically include "advanced age" among the impermissible grounds
of differentiation; yet, the general prescriptions on nondiscrimination are, as
repeatedly indicated, designed to be illustrative rather than exhaustive. 0 The
transnational prescriptions barring discrimination are broad and far reaching.
Further, the United Nations Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, the two International Covenants on Human Rights, and other
related human rights prescriptions are explicitly worded to protect "everyone,"
presumably including every human being regardless of chronological age.31
Recently, this general policy of nondiscrimination has been emphatically
reiterated as a major objective of the Declaration on Social Progress and
Development, adopted by the General Assembly in December 1969:
28. See U.N. Study on the Aged, supra note 3, at 16-28.
29. Curtin observed: "[O]ur culture does not have a concept of the whole of life.
Instead, life is divided into childhood, adulthood, and old age. Instead of a cycle, a vision
has the possibility
of unity, we have a vision of stages, in which only one-adulthoodof being lived productively, independently, and vigorously. Old age is viewed as a childlike
state, but without the charm and promise. It is as if we wanted to finally view our lives
as totally devoid of meaning, where the dependency and childishness of old age wipe out
the accomplishments of adulthood. The experiences of a lifetime disappear in the feeling
of being useless and passed by." S. CURTN, NOBODY EvER DuIm OF Ow AGE 227 (1972).
"30. See McDougal, Iasswell, & Chen, The Protection of Aliens From Discrimination
and World Public Order: Responsibility of States Conjoined with Human Rights, 70 AM.
J. Irr'LL. 432 (1976); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Human Rights for Women and World
Public Order: The Outlawing of Sex-Based Discrimination, 69 AM. J. INT'L L. 497 (1975);
McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Protection of Respect and Human Rights: Freedom
of Choice and World Public Order, 24 AM. U.L. Rrv. 919, 1034-86 (1975); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, The Right to Religious Freedom and World Public Order: The Emerging
Norm of Non-Discrimination, 74 MicH. L. Rav. No. 5 (April 1976); McDougal, Lasswell,
& Chen, Freedom From Discrimination in Choice of Language and International Human
Rights, 1976 So. ILL. U.L.J. 151 (1976); McDougal, Lasswell, & Chen, Non-Conforming
Political Opinion and Human Rights: Transnational Protection Against Discrimination,
2 YA=l STUDiES OF WORD PuBLIC ORDEa No. 1 (1975).
31. Id.
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Social progress and development shall aim at the continuous raising
of the material and spiritual standards of living of all members ot
society, with respect for and in compliance with human rights and
fundamental freedoms, through the attainment of the following main
goals:
The elimination of all forms of discrimination and exploitation and
all other practices and ideologies contrary to the purposes and principles
of the Charter of the United Nations .... 32
The growing worldwide concern for the protection of the aged prompted
the United Nations to undertake a timely study on the "Question of the
Elderly and the Aged," 33 culminating in the adoption by the General Assembly
of a resolution on this subject in December 1973. 34 Emphasizing "respect
for the dignity and worth of the human person" enunciated in the Universal
Declaration,35 reiterating that "the protection of the rights and welfare of
the aged is one of the main goals of the Declaration on Social Progress and
Development,"3 6 and underscoring "the growing interest for developing and
developed societies alike in the fuller participation of the elderly in the
mainstream of national societies," 37 the General Assembly urged member
states to "enhance the contribution of the elderly to social and economic
development"3 8 and to "discourage, wherever and whenever the overall situation allows, discriminatory attitudes, policies and measures in employment
practices based exclusively on age."3 9
Though the relevant human rights prescriptions are silent on the question
of age-based mandatory retirement, it would appear that the more general
norm of nondiscrimination,40 conjoined with the protected right to work,
must outlaw such an invidious practice and policy. The right to work is
well protected under transnational prescriptions; the Universal Declaration
of Human Rights enunciates in Article 23(1) that "[e]veryone has the right
to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable conditions of
work and to protection against unemployment."41 The International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights in Article 6 fortifies the right to
work in these affirmative terms:
1. The States' Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to
work, which includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to
32. G.A. Res. 2542, pt. 2, art. 12(b), 24 U.N. GAOR Supp. 30, at 49, 50-51, U.N.
Doc. A/7630 (1969). The text of this resolution is reproduced in HUMAN RiGnrs: A COMPiILATION OF INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS OF THE UNITED NATIONS 97, 98-99, U.N. Doc. ST/HR/I
(1973) [hereinafter cited as U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS].
33. U.N. Study on the Aged, supra note 3.
34. G.A. Res. 3137, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 80, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 81.
39. Id.
40. See note 30 supra.
41. U.N. HUMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 2.
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gain his living by work which he freely chooses or accepts, and will
take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.
2. The steps to be taken by a State Party to the present Covenant to
achieve the full realization of this right shall include technical and
vocational guidance and training programmes, policies and techniques to achieve steady economic, social and cultural development
and full and productive employment under conditions safeguarding
fundamental political and economic freedoms to the individual.42
The contracting states not only recognize the right to work but also pledge
to "take appropriate steps to safeguard" this right. Similarly, the Declaration
on Social Progress and Development of 1969 in Article 6 proclaims that
"[s]ocial development requires the assurance to everyone of the right to work
and the free choice of employment" 43 and that "[s]ocial progress and development require the participation of all members of society in productive and
socially useful labour ....
44
Prevention of discrimination is only one facet of the protection of persons
of advanced age. They may have special infirmities requiring special measures
of assistance.4 5 This critical need is well recognized in various transnational
prescriptions. For instance, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in
Article 25(1) states:
Everyone has the right to a standard of living adequate for the health
and well-being of himself and of his family, including food, clothing,
housing and medical care and necessary social services, and the right
to security in the event of unemployment, sickness, disability, widowhood,
old age or lack of livelihood in circumstances beyond his control 4 6
Similarly, this concern is evident in the resolution on the "Question of the
Elderly and the Aged" adopted on December 14, 1973, by the General
Assembly of the United Nations.47 More specifically, in its separate resolution
on "Social Security for the Aged" adopted on the same date, the General
Assembly urged Member Governments to provide the aged "adequate social
security payments," "sufficient institutions for the care of aged persons. re-

42. Id. at 4.
43. Id. at 98.
44. Id. On the right to work, see INTERNATIONAL LABoUR OFFICE, THEi.L.O. AND HUMAN
RIGHTS 76-84 (Report Presented by the -International Labour Organization to the International Conference on Human Rights, (1968); C. JENKS, THE COMMON LAW OF MANKIND
255-99 (1958); C. JENKS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL LABOUR STANDARDS 119-23 (1960);
Jenks, Work, Leisure and Social Security as Human Rights in the World Community, 9 J.
INT'L COMM. JURISTS 49 (1968).
45. See U.N. Study on the Aged, supra note 3, at 38-54; STAFF OF SENATE SUBCOMM.
ON AGING OF THE COMM. ON LABOR AND PUBLIC WELFARE AND THE SPECIAL COMM. ON AGING,
93d Cong, Ist Sess., Posr-WurrE HOUSE CONFERENCE ON AGING REPORTS -. 1973 (Joint

Comm. Print 1973).
46.

U.N. HuMAN RIGHTS INSTRUMENTS, supra note 32, at 2-3 (emphasis added).

47. GA. Res. 3137, supra note 34.
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quiring medical treatment," and adequate "architectural facilities" and
"housing.""s
The question of protecting the aged is beginning to receive increased
attention within many national communities whose principal efforts relate
to special assistance in terms of income (social security), housing, and medical
care. 49 In addition, efforts have increasingly been directed to challenge the
policy and practice of age-based mandatory retirement. Recent developments
within the United States exemplify this new endeavor. 50
WEIss, LAFLEUR, AND MURGIA

After repeated attempts beginning in the 1950's, the United States Congress
finally, in 1967, adopted the Age Discrimination Employment Act. 51 The act
is designed to "promote employment of older persons based on their ability
rather than age; to prohibit arbitrary age discrimination in employment; to
help employers and workers find ways of meeting problems arising from the
impact of age on employment." 52 Its proscription of discrimination extends
to discharging practices as 'well as hiring practices, encompassing such matters
as "hiring, job retention, compensation, promotions, and other conditions
and privileges of employment." 53 The act bars employers, employment agencies,
and labor organizations from practicing age-based discrimination against "individuals who are at least forty years of age but less than sixty-five years of
age."5 4 The act authorizes an aggrieved individual or a group of persons under
its protective umbrella to bring a civil action for "such legal or equitable
relief as may be appropriate to effectuate the purposes" of the act, "including
48. G.A. Res. 3138, 28 U.N. GAOR, Supp. 30, at 81, U.N. Doc. A/9030 (1973).
Worthy of special notice also is the important role played by the International Labor
Organization. See generally E. HAAS, HUMAN RIGHTS AND INTERNATIONAL ACTION (1970);
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR OFFICE, THE ILO IN THE SERVICE OF SOCIAL PROGRESS (1969);
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATIONS, CONVENTIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS ADOIED BY THE
INTERNATIONAL LABOUR CONFERENCE, 1919-1966 (1966); C. JENKS, LAW, FREEDOM AND WELFARE
101-36 (1963); C. JENKS, SOCIAL JUSTICE IN THE LAW OF NATIONS: THE ILO IMPACT AFrER
FIFTY YEARS (1970); E. LANDY, THE EFFECTIVENESS OF INTERNATIONAL SUPERVISION: THIRTY
YEARS OF I.L.O. EXPERIENCE (1966); Jenks, Human Rights, Social Justice and Peace: The
Broader Significance of the I.L.O. Experience, in INTERNATIONAL PROTECTION OF HUMAN

RIGHTS 227 (A. Eide & A. Schou eds. 1968).
49. The authors propose to deal with this question under Claims Relating to Special
Assistance, in a forthcoming book HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD PUBLIC ORDER.

50. See Agatstein, The Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967: A Critique, 19
N.Y. L. FORUM 309 (1973); Brennan, State Legislation Prohibiting Discrimination in Employment Because of Age, 18 HASTINGS L.J. 539 (1967); Halgren, Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967, 43 LAB. BULL. 361 (1968); Serwer, Mandatory Retirement at Age
65--A Survey of the Law, INDUSTRIAL GERONTOLOGY 11 (Winter 1974); Age Discrimination

in Employment, supra note 4; Mandatory Retirement, supra note 4; Too Old to Work,
supra note 4.
51. 29 U.S.C. §§621-34 (1970).
52. Id. §621(b).
53. See U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, THE LAW AGAINST AGE DISCRIMINATION IN EMPLOYMENT

(1970); Improving the Age Discrimination Law, A

Working Paper, prepared for use by

the Special Committee on Aging, United States Senate, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973).

54.

29 U.S.C. §631 (1970).
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without limitation judgments compelling employment, reinstatement or
promotion." 55 The right of recourse to civil action ceases, however, on the
commencement of suit by the Secretary of Labor to enforce the right of
the aggrieved party. 56 The Secretary of Labor is entrusted with the primary
responsibility of enforcement. 57 Criminal sanctions are to be imposed upon
those who "forcibly resist, oppose, impede, intimidate or interfere with a
duly authorized representative of the Secretary," while performing his duties
under the act.58
It is unfortunate, as commentators have repeatedly pointed out, that this
act protects only those who are between ages, 40 and 65. 59 Substantial opinion
urges removal of this age limitation and the extension of protection against
age-based discrimination to those who are below 40, and espedially to those
who are over 65. Despite this shortcoming and other inadequacies, such as
the limited scope of coverage in terms of employers ° and "superficial enforcement," 61 the Age Discrimination Employment Act represents a giant step
toward protection against age-based discrimination.
Meanwhile, litigation has gone forward to challenge the constitutionality
of the age sixty-five employment barrier by invoking the due process clauses
of the fifth and fourteenth amendments and the equal protection clause
of the fourteenth amendment. Weiss v. Walsh,62 decided in 1971, marked the
first important challenge. The plaintiff, Paul Weiss, a renowned philosopher,
complained that Fordham University had offered him the Albert Schweitzer
Chair in Humanities only to withdraw the offer later simply because of the
"eleventh-hour" objection 3 by the New York State Department of Education
that he had passed age 65. Dismissing the plaintiff's claim that the act of
withdrawing the offer was in violation of the first, fifth, and fourteenth amendments of the Constitution, Judge Tyler observed that: "[B]eing a classification
that cuts fully across racial, religi6us, and economic lines, and one that
generally bears some relation to mental and physical capacity, age is less
likely to be an invidious distinction."64 He added:
Notwithstanding great advances in gerontology, the era when advanced
age ceases to bear some reasonable statistical relationship to diminished
55. 29 U.S.C.-§626(b) (1970).
56. 29 US.C. §626(c) (1970).
57. 29 US.C. §§624-28 (1970).
58. 29 U.S.C. §629 (1970).
59. See, e.g., Age DiscriminationEmployment, supra note 4, at 1331-52; Mandatory Retirement, supra note 4, at 135-47.
60. Initially, the act confined "employer" to "a person engaged in an industry affecting
commerce who has twenty-five or more employees." 29 U.S.C. §630(b) (1970). Government
employees, federal and state, did not come within the protection of the act. Id. Sub-

sequently, in 1974 the act was amended to apply to government employees as well as
industries with twenty or more employees. H.R. REP. No. 93-953, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 21-23

(1974).
61. Mandatory Retirement, supra note 4, at 135.
62. Weiss v. Walsh, 324 F. Supp. 75 (S.DN.Y. 1971).
63. Id. at 76.

64. Id. at 77.
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capacity or longevity is still future. It cannot be said, therefore, that
age ceilings upon eligibility for employment are inherently suspect,
although their application will inevitably fall unjustly in the individual
case. 65
Although this reasoning was less than convincing, 6 the decision was affirmed
without opinion in 1972 by the Second Circuit 7 and was denied certiorari
8
in 1973 by the United States Supreme Court.
One year later the Supreme Court addressed an equal protection challenge
to school board mandatory leave regulations in an opinion that suggested
parallels to mandatory retirement laws. In Cleveland Board of Education v.
LaFleur,69 the Court held unconstitutional the regulations of two school
boards, one in Cleveland, Ohio, and the other in Chesterfield County, Virginia,
requiring pregnant teachers to take unpaid maternity leave several months
in advance of the expected childbirth. The Court outlawed these regulations
as an unwarranted infringement upon "freedom of personal choice in
matters of marriage and family life, ' ' 70 which is protected by the due process
clause of the fourteenth amendment. The two school boards contended that
"firm cut off dates are necessary to maintain continuity of classroom instruction,""' and to allow sufficient time to find and hire a qualified substitute.
Finally, the Board noted that "at least some teachers become physically incapable of adequately performing certain of their duties during the latter
part of pregnancy." 72 Dismissing the arguments of the school boards, Mr.
Justice Stewart, writing for the majority, declared that:
[T]he provisions amount to a conclusive presumption that every
pregnant teacher who reaches the fifth or sixth month of pregnancy is
physically incapable of continuing. There is no individualized determination by the teacher's doctor - or the school board's - as to any
particular teacher's ability to continue at her job. The rules contain
an irrebuttable presumption of physical incompetency, and that preindividual
sumption applies even when the medical evidence as to 7an
woman's physical status might be wholly to the contrary. 3
The Court concluded that "the mandatory termination provisions of the
Cleveland and Chesterfield County maternity regulations violate the Due
Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, because of their use of un65. Id.
66. Cf. e.g., Eglit, supra note 4, at 92-96; Age Discrimination in Employment, supra
note 4, at 1336-52; Mandatory Retirement, supra note 4, at 137-46.
67. 461 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1972).
68. 409 U.S. 1129 (1973). Invoking Weiss a United States district court in Nebraska
subsequently decided that the mandatory retirement at age 65, prescribed by the Douglass
County Civil Service Act, is "a permissible means of accomplishing a rational and reasonable
objective" and therefore not in contravention of the United States Constitution. Armstrong
v. Howell, 371 F. Supp. 48 (D. Neb. 1974).
69. Cleveland Bd. of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974).
70. Id. at 639.
71. Id. at 640.
72. Id. at 641.
73. Id. at 644.
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warranted conclusive presumptions that seriously burden the exercise of
protected constitutional liberty."74
The implications of the Court's holding for the outlawing of age-based
mandatory retirement were keenly, and perhaps prophetically, perceived by
Justice Rehnquist in his dissenting opinion. Since "the right to work for
a living in the common occupations of the community," as enunciated in
Truax v. Raich75 is "presumably on the same lofty footing as the right of
choice in matters of family life,"' 76 "the Court," observed Justice Rehnquist,
"will have to strain valiantly in order to avoid having today's opinion lead
to the invalidation of mandatory retirement statutes for governmental
77
employees."
The incisive intimation of Justice Rehnquist found expression, shortly
afterwards, in Murgia v. Massachusetts Board of Retirement78 The case
challenged the constitutionality of a Massachusetts statute prescribing mandatory retirement of state police officers at 50 years of age. In response to the
argument that such age-based mandatory retirement "enhances the morale
of the younger members" and facilitates "rapid promotion," the three judge
court urged that "the attractiveness of quick promotion must be weighed
against the unattractiveness of early retirement." 79 After analyzing the objective of rapid promotion, the court concluded that this statute was simply
an example of per se age discrimination.s0 The court then declared the
statutory provision at issue "unconstitutional and void" holding that:
[M]andatory retirement at age 50, where individualized medical screening is not only available but already required, is no more rational,
and no more related to a protectable state interest, than the mandatory
suspension or discharge of school teachers upon reaching their fourth

or fifth month of pregnancy 8 '

On appeal, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the statute was
rationally related to the state objective of protecting the public by "assuring
physical preparedness of its uniformed police."8' 2 Recognizing that "physical
ability generally declines with age," 8 3 the Court concluded that mandatory
retirement of police officers at age 50 removed from the service policemen
84
"whose fitness for uniformed work presumptively has diminished with age."
While admitting that treatment of the aged in this country has not been
74. Id. at 651.
75. Truax v. Raich, 239 U.S. 33, 41 (1915).
76. 414 U.S. at 659.
77. Id.
78. 376 F. Supp. 753 (D. Mass. 1974).
79. Id. at 754.
80. Id. at 755.
81. Id. at 756.
82. Massachusetts Bd. of Retirement v. Murgia, 96 S. Ct. 2562 (1976).
83. Id. at 2567. The Court, however, did note that the "testimony also recognized that
particular individuals over 50 could be capable of safely performing the functions of

uniformed officers." Id. at 2566.
84. Id. at 2567-68.
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"wholly free of discrimination," the Court declined to recognize age as a
suspect classification. 85
In dissent Justice Marshall argued that previous decisions had recognized
that an individual's right to work was a liberty interest guaranteed by the
fourteenth amendment and that the State of Massachusetts must show "a
reasonably substantial interest" in preserving the validity of the statute in
question.86 Since policemen over 40 years of age had to undergo annual
physical examinations to remain on the force, the automatic termination of
these officers from the force at age 50 seemed the "height of irrationality." 7
Notably absent from either the per curiam or dissenting opinions was any
reference to LaFleur. The failure to distinguish or to discuss this case is
inexplicable since the lower court found this analogy to be compelling.
Although noting that the problems of retirement are "beyond serious
dispute,"8s8 the Murgia Court declined to hold mandatory retirement laws
for policemen unconstitutional. This decision should not, however, preclude
other challenges to these laws in jobs where physical stamina is relatively
unimportant.89 As data accumulates on the relationship between aging and
85. Id. at 2566-67. Unlike persons discriminated against on the basis of race or national
origin, the elderly "have not experienced a 'history of purposeful unequal treatment' or
been subjected to unique disabilities on the basis of stereotyped characteristics not truly
indicative of their abilities." Id. The dissenting opinion found it indisputable that the
elderly constitute a class subject to "repeated and arbitrary" employment discrimination,
regardless of whether the group constituted a suspect class. Id. at 2572 (Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
86. Id. at 2572. Mr. Justice Marshall has consistently advocated abandoning the rigid
two-tier equal protection analysis still adhered to by a majority of the Court in favor
of a flexible sliding scale approach that considers "the character of the classification in
question, the relative importance to individuals in the class discriminated against of the
governmental benefits that they do not receive, and the state interests asserted in support
of the classification." Id. at 2569. (Marshall, J., dissenting).
The reasons for holding the group categorization of individuals in terms of advanced
age to be impermissible discrimination are eloquently stated by Justice Marshall. "While
depriving any government employee of his job is a significant deprivation, it is particularly
burdensome when the person deprived is an older citizen. Once terminated, the elderly
cannot readily find alternative employment. The lack of work is not only economically
damaging, but emotionally and physically draining. Deprived of his status in the community
and of the opportunity for meaningful activity, fearful of becoming dependent on others
for his support, and lonely in his new-found isolation, the involuntarily retired person is
susceptible to physical and emotional ailments as a direct consequence of his enforced
idleness. Ample clinical evidence supports the conclusion that mandatory retirement poses
a direct threat to the health and life expectancy of the retired person, and these
consequences of termination for age are not disputed by appellant. Thus, an older person
deprived of his job by the government loses not only his right to earn a living, but, too
often, his health as well, in sad contradiction of Browning's promise, 'The best is yet to
be/The last of life, for which the first was made.'" Id. at 2571-72 (footnotes omitted).
87. Id. at 2573 (Marshall, J., dissenting). In this situation, since annual physical
examinations were required from age 40 on, there would be no additional administrative
burden required if physically fit officers were allowed to continue working past age 50. See
text accompanying note 22 supra.
88. 96 S. Ct. at 2568 (footnote omitted).
89. "The Court's conclusion today does not imply that all mandatory retirement laws
are constitutionally valid. Here the primary state interest is in maintaining a physically
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productivity,90 and as the life span of the average American lengthens,9'
courts will find it increasingly difficult to find any rational basis behind
mandatory retirement laws.

FuTrruR DrvELoPmETs
Among the policy questions that should receive greater attention in the
next few years are the questions that relate to treatment of the aging. Research
has stimulated decision makers to recognize the cumulative importance of
the elderly. In industrializing societies the alleged resistance of the old to
technical modernization has generated conflict in societies where age traditionally has been treated with great deference. In advanced industrial societies
the discovery that, barring catastrophe, people will live even longer has
spread confusion, uncertainty, and conflict among the policy makers in both
public and civic order.
The policy of excluding the aged from significant social roles is open
to so much adverse criticism that categorical declarations of obsolescence are
not likely to survive. Our world is accustomed to mobilizing scientific
knowledge and creative ingenuity, and'it seems probable that these assets
will be increasingly directed to problems connected with aging. The most
fundamental approach is likely to be in terms of the overriding goal of finding
social institutions that optimize the opportunities open to human beings at
all levels of chronological aging. Assume, for instance, that we are on the
brink of acquiring the knowledge necessary to lengthen every productive
life some 100 years. It will be urgent that these capacities be utilized to
improve the functioning of all institutions, so that value shaping activities
are successfully expanded in both the material and the symbolic sectors of
society. Enough has been accomplished already, though on a diminutive
scale, to project the expectation that our civilization can continue to reconstruct itself in terms of its aspirations and capabilities.
Unlike problems specialized to some other forms of freedom, the immediate
future of the human rights of the aged will focus on the intelligence, promotional, and prescriptive components of community decision making. The
world community has not yet explicitly formulated the relevant general
prescriptions or provided the structures of authority and procedures necessary
to the effective application of these prescriptions. Our national community
might appropriately reaffirm its commitment to the concept of human
dignity. 2
fit police force, not a mentally alert or manually dexterous workforce.

. . .

Accordingly,

a mandatory retirement law for all government employees would stand in a posture
different from the law before us today." Id. at 2573 n.8 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
90. See notes 19-21 supra and accompanying text.
91. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
92. In a sequence of articles the authors have discussed separately the claims relating
to discrimination based on the grounds of race, sex, religion, political or other opinion,
language, alienage, and advanced age. See note 30 supra. A policy pervading so many
different grounds of impermissible differentiation amply establishes that the contemporary
norm of nondiscrimination is broad in reach. Studies of other grounds remain to be made.
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A brief itemization might include: possession of property, birth (legitimate or illegitimate
child), homosexuality (sexual orientation), marital status, health (mental defect or illness),
derivation of nationality (by birth or by naturalization), moral character, behavior
(criminal record), literacy, occupation (profession), nonidentification (disloyalty), and culture.
Community prescriptions about these bases of differentiation are in the process of development.
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